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AUTHORITY

AGO ltr 29 Apr 1980

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IN REPLY REFER TO  
 AGDA (M) (26 Nov 69) FOR OT UT 693342

5 December 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 507th Transportation Group, Period Ending 31 July 1969

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 4b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.
2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

*Kenneth G. Wickham*  
 KENNETH G. WICKHAM  
 Major General, USA  
 The Adjutant General

1 Incl  
 as

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507th Transportation Group

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY CPT Jones/dtl/T-3031  
HQ, 507TH TRANSPORTATION GROUP (MOVEMENT CONTROL)  
APO 96309

AVGI-SP

15 August 1969

SUBJECT: Operation Report of 507th Transportation Group (Movement Control)  
for Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

Commanding General  
United States Army, Vietnam  
ATTN: AVHGC-DST  
APO 96375

1. Section 1, Operations: Significant Activities. The 507th Transportation Group (Movement Control) was designated Traffic Management Agency, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam and placed under the operational control of MACV J4, by MACV General Order 302, dated 9 March 1969. During the period of this report (1 May - 31 July 1969) Traffic Management Agency (TMA) continued its mission of transportation movement control and the management of the MACV Common Service/User Transportation System in the Republic of Vietnam with primary emphasis being placed on the following aspects:

a. PASSENGER AND CARGO MOVEMENTS:

	<u>AIR</u>		<u>WATER</u>	<u>RAIL</u>	<u>*HIGHWAY</u>
	<u>No PAX</u>	<u>Cargo STON</u>	<u>Cargo STON</u>	<u>Cargo STON</u>	<u>Cargo STON</u>
May	310,372	61,588	1,170,528	64,468	22,995
JUN	298,096	51,554	1,586,506	68,735	18,982
JUL	318,888	50,458	1,070,452	60,835	19,005

\*Includes only TMA controlled movement to, within and from the Delta.

b. INTERNAL ORGANIZATION OF TMA:

(1) Since the establishment of TMA, movement control functions in the Republic of Vietnam have steadily increased without a corresponding increase in assigned/attached personnel. A new MTOE has been submitted to HQ, USARV for approval. Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps personnel are being placed on duty either in TDY status, or by inter-service agreements. Based on past experience, and considering the TMA requirement for organizational flexibility and responsiveness to tactical movement demands, a study is being made of the advantages and disadvantages of staffing TMA by a Joint Table of Distribution

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SUBJECT: Operation Report of 507th Transportation Group (Movement Control)  
for the Period Ending 30 April 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (RI) (U)

(JTD). Staffing in this manner would provide necessary organizational flexibility, and would allow direct assignment of personnel to specific position vacancies, thereby eliminating the present administrative burden being experienced in obtaining personnel from five different agencies (USARV, III MAF, 7TH AF, NSA Saigon, NSA Danang). However, no final decision has been reached in this matter.

(2) TMA does not exercise control over any of the assets made available to the MACV Common Service Transportation System (CSTS) in the Republic of Vietnam, but rather, it manages the use of such, excluding US-owned rail cars. This Agency receives requirements from MACV component commands, USAID, Vietnam Regional Exchange Service, Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces, and other agencies authorized to use the Common Service Transportation System and balances them with mode capabilities as required. These requirements are matched against available assets within the CSTS, based on priorities of movement and required delivery dates established by the shippers.

c. STATUS OF PERSONNEL:

(1) STRENGTHS:

	<u>ARMY</u> <u>OFF/EM</u>	<u>NAVY</u> <u>OFF/EM</u>	<u>AIR FORCE</u> <u>OFF/EM</u>	<u>MARINE</u> <u>OFF/EM</u>	<u>IN</u> <u>CIV</u>
MAY	79/314	3/10	7/22	3/0	67
JUN	80/316	3/10	7/22	3/0	67
JUL	78/314	3/10	7/22	3/0	67

(2) CASUALTIES: 0

(3) EVACUATIONS: 3

(4) AWARDS/DECORATIONS:

a. Legion of Merit: 4

b. Bronze Star: 24

c. Joint Service Commendation Medal: 22

d. Army Commendation Medal: 28

e. MACV Certificate of Achievement: 3

d. EXPANSION OF OPERATIONS: NONE

Inclosure

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SUBJECT: Operation Report of 507th Transportation Group (Movement Control)  
for Period Ending 30 April 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

e. NORMAL OPERATIONS: Throughout the reporting period the 507th Transportation Group (Movement Control) carried on normal operations.

2. Section 2, Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations:

- a. Personnel: NONE
- b. Operations: See Annex A - D.
- c. Training: NONE
- d. Intelligence: NONE
- e. Logistics: NONE
- f. Organization: NONE
- g. Other: NONE

FOR THE COMMANDER:

4 Incl

- 1. Annex A. AIRLIFT
- 2. Annex B, LAND MOVEMENTS
- 3. Annex C, SEALIFT
- 4. Annex D, GENERAL

*C. C. Rhodes*  
C. C. RHODES  
Major, AGC  
Adjutant

## ANNEX A, AIRLIFT

### 1. Consolidating Special Airlift Missions and Converting to Scheduled Missions:

OBSERVATION: Eight special airlift missions for passenger movements operated in III CTZ daily were providing required air support. Aircraft were C-123 models, combat load configured C-123's were utilized. These missions were scheduled into the various aerial ports within two hours of the time requested for passenger movement. On several occasions, aircraft "no shows" occurred due to aircraft maintenance, higher priority movements, or crew members running out of "crew-duty" time. Aircraft usage from destination aerial ports was low in many cases as there was no airlift requirement for the aircraft's next stop.

EVALUATION: It was determined that those eight missions could be performed by one aircraft within the normal crew-duty time of one crew. As a result, one regularly scheduled air mission was developed and implemented encompassing each of the eight separate missions. Specific advantages of this mission are: (1) it is designated a "Star" mission by the 834th Air Division which means replacement aircraft are to be provided whenever necessary to complete its scheduled mission; (2) the aircraft is passenger-configured providing a seat for each passenger; (3) aircraft operates on a schedule providing regular departure times and seven day's advance booking; and (4) maximum use of aircraft between stations is insured.

RECOMMENDATION: Recommend that full consideration be given to all aspects of air movements when determining the "best" means of transporting personnel and that consolidation of special airlift missions and conversion to scheduled missions be undertaken, wherever feasible, throughout the transportation system.



ANNEX A, (Cont'd)

2. Revising Air Schedules.

**OBSERVATION:** It was reported by HQ, 1st Logistics Command that previous actions taken by TMA and 834th Air Division to effect satisfactory air movement of chill & freeze (C & F) items from Cam Ranh Bay were inadequate, resulting in unnecessary spoilage of these items. They suggested that further revisions be made to aircraft departure time from Cam Ranh Bay so that aircraft schedule reliability would be increased.

**EVALUATION:**

a. Upon close review, it was determined that aircraft schedule reliability could not be increased by further changes to aircraft departure times. Delays result from occurrences which are difficult to predict e.g. emergency airlift for tactical operations or higher priority movements, aircraft down for maintenance, weather conditions, etc.

b. The reefer storage facilities at Cam Ranh Bay are inadequate for storage or holding of these chill and freeze items being transported by air. As a result, if an emergency or unprogrammed event develops which precludes normal aircraft availability, refrigerated items must remain in port, as packaged, until a replacement aircraft is available. Spoilage may then result.

**RECOMMENDATION:** In the movement of refrigerated items, recommend that full consideration be given to providing adequate storage facilities for these items in order to meet all contingencies which develop in a war-time situation. When feasible, permanent structures should be constructed. Insulated containers are required for those areas where storage capability is not available.

3. The Dow Insulated Container.

OBSERVATION: Ninety-nine Dow Insulated Containers plus 35 refrigeration units were procured for use by American Forces in the Republic of Vietnam. They were received in-country in June 1968. The unit cost per container was reported as \$2,390.00. The container will maintain temperatures required for frozen or refrigerated items. Desired temperatures may be maintained indefinitely when refrigeration unit is attached. Units were distributed to the various support command throughout RVN. At last report 73 containers remain in the system; the precise number being operational is not known.

EVALUATION: The following comments were provided by persons directly involved with use of the container and are intended to relate advantages and disadvantages of the container for any future reference.

a. Advantages: The containers have proven to be very useful in the movement of large quantities of refrigerated or frozen items. A great deal of port handling is eliminated which otherwise is required when shipments are split. If the container is properly refrigerated, the prospect of spoilage is very small. It may also be used as storage container for those instances in which items are not readily consumed. The dimensions of the container, L-83", W-103", and H-81.5", allow for movement via C-130 and C-123 type aircraft.

b. Disadvantages: The containers are constructed basically from styrofoam. This material is not designed for its strength, but rather for its ability to maintain temperatures. Entire sections of these containers have been destroyed or holes punched through them by forklifts. They are not to be taken off the 463-L pallets at any time while being utilized. Their use on over-the-road type vehicles is limited unless roads are smoothly paved and handling is slight. Due to the intense and continuous heat in Vietnam during most months, difficulty in maintaining desired temperatures has resulted. Another problem that has been experienced as a result of climate has been rusting of the door hinges, causing some units to be nonfunctional as the doors could not swing properly. Hinges run the entire length of the door and their replacement is difficult and time consuming.

RECOMMENDATION: Recommend that full consideration be given to construction of permanent-type facilities at each of the major aerial ports to store chill and freeze items. High volume movements occur at these ports and would justify the relatively high construction costs. The end result would be a better product for US service user both in quantity and quality. The styrofoam containers should be strengthened to increase durability and hardness, and should be used only to transport chill and freeze items between the major aerial ports. They should not be purchased for purpose of storage or for over-the-road travel.

ANNEX A, (Cont'd)

4. Movement of EDP Aircraft Parts.

OBSERVATION: 14th Aviation Battalion, Chu Lai and 101st Airborne Division, Hue/Phu Bai in the past have experienced difficulties in movement of EDP, "999" and other priority aircraft parts from Qui Nhon/Phu Cat aerial ports. Time lost in receipt of parts was caused by delays in the supply system's time required to fill requisitions and in the transportation shipping time. Movement of aircraft parts was expedited through use of organic airlift assets by the Americal Division; but the loss of blade time proved undesirable.

EVALUATION: It was determined that movement of aircraft parts required either a Special Mission Airlift Request (S'AR) or dedicated airlift. Movement of cargo by S'AR was considered unsatisfactory as the weight would have been low and cancellation of S'AR aircraft setups is frequent due to higher priority movements. The solution reached for movement of Chu Lai cargo was to place one pallet of cargo on a C-123 passenger aircraft daily. This provided a scheduled airlift service to Chu Lai for "999" parts. Shipment of aircraft parts to Hue/Phu Bai was determined to be adequate when shipping plane load lots of cargo, but inadequate in those cases where one or two pallets were to be shipped. The solution in this instance was to transship all less than plane load lots through Da Nang. Additionally, a status of aircraft parts in the aerial port is forwarded daily to Airlift Division, TMA for monitoring of movement.

RECOMMENDATION: Recommend that maximum use of scheduled airlift be effected where possible to reduce the number of S'ARs. Additionally, transshipment should be used, but only in those instances where cargo in small quantities cannot be moved expeditiously.

ANNEX A, (Cont'd)

5. Closure of Aerial Port.

OBSERVATION: On 23 June Qui Nhon Army Airfield was closed for repair and renovation of the runway surface. Prior to initiation of construction activities; meetings were held to discuss problem areas that were expected to arise and to alert all concerned of the pending closure. Original closing date was established as 16 June 1969.

EVALUATION: Closure of the Qui Nhon Army Airfield was not accomplished as originally planned due to inadequate preparation. Problems not fully resolved prior to termination of activities were:

a. Transportation of personnel for passenger missions was not resolved. Originally, all passengers were to be bussed to and from Qui Nhon, but this was changed and extended only to US personnel.

b. No consideration was given to Medivac flights of the 67th Evacuation Hospital from Qui Nhon to hospitals outside Vietnam.

c. Firm support requirements were not tasked to Phu Cat Air Base.

d. Security requirements at Phu Cat required that all Vietnamese be off the Air Base by 1700 hours, daily, but three passenger missions arrived and departed Phu Cat after the established cut-off time. Revision of passenger schedules was required to overcome this problem.

e. Personnel strengths of JMATCO and Det 8, 14th Aerial Port squadron were inadequate to absorb the increased work load.

RECOMMENDATION: Recommend that all preplanning for airfield closure be made well in advance of actual closure to preclude excessive problem areas.

ANNEX A, (Cont'd)

6. Delay in Transporting Chill and Freeze Cargo from the Aerial Port (POD) to the Commodity User.

OBSERVATION: Chill and freeze milk cargo had been arriving at DTO location between 0600 and 0900 daily. The aerial port personnel did not know when aircraft arrived with frozen products until the aircraft was on the ground and being unloaded. Delay in notification often resulted in milk setting in port up to four or five hours because no transportation was available.

EVALUATION:

a. Arrangements have been made to have trailers spotted at aerial ports between 0600 and 0900 hours daily. Chill and freeze cargo is immediately loaded onto the trailers upon arrival of aircraft.

b. The transportation unit is notified when trailers are ready to be picked up and delivered to ration break down.

c. Proper coordination between TMA (Traffic Region and DTO), 15th Aerial Port Squadron, and 26th Gp MC has resulted in chill and freeze arriving at proper destination with minimum of delay and spoilage.

RECOMMENDATION: Recommend that these actions be taken in similar cases throughout the transportation system.

## ANNEX B, LAND MOVEMENTS

### 1. Enemy Interdiction of Rail Lines.

OBSERVATION: Enemy incidents decreased during the quarter. Only eight enemy incidents caused damage to the rail line or rail equipment during the quarter, as opposed to 17 during the first quarter.

EVALUATION: This decrease can be directly attributed to increased ARVN command interest in rail security. This region coordinates daily with the military railway security advisor, who in turn applies pressure through his command channels for increased rail security. Both JGS and the CG, 22nd ARVN Division, have directed that Regional Forces assigned rail security missions must provide rail security including the rail bridges. In addition, a daily patrol train is now utilized. This has substantially helped alleviate the problem.

RECOMMENDATION: Recommend that the importance of all rail security be impressed upon ARVN from the highest command levels.



ANNEX B, (Cont'd)

2. Cargo Pilferage.

OBSERVATION: On 25 May and 10 June, food and cement were pilfered from trains on the Phu Cat line by both the local populace and ARVN train guards. The Traffic Region discussed this problem with the ARVN 2d Zone Transportation Officer. He has written a letter to the CO, 2d Railway Security Battalion stating that pilferage will not be tolerated and holding the Security Battalion Commander personally responsible.

EVALUATION: Rail cargo loaded on flatcars is highly susceptible to pilferage, not only by the local populace, but ARVN rail security guards as well.

RECOMMENDATION: Rail cargo security be made a matter of command interest at the highest ARVN levels. In addition, US Train Guards must accompany each train and report each incident of attempted bribery and pilferage.

ANNEX B, (Cont'd)

3. Expansion of Rail Freight Service to the Long Binh Depot.

OBSERVATION: The present system of moving reefer cargo from the port to the Long Binh Depot is cumbersome and expensive. Reefer cargo is being loaded in CONEX containers and refrigerated vans and moved by highway to the Long Binh Depot.

EVALUATION: Newly completed Class I storage warehouses at the US Army Depot, Long Binh have been accepted by the Army and are operational. There is no rail spur line into the Long Binh Depot. Refrigerated rail cars are available to be used to move reefer cargo from the port to the warehouses at Long Binh. At present, these cars are being used only for the storage of port cargo after discharge from reefer vessels. These cars could be more efficiently utilized if it were possible to use them for port clearance of reefer cargo. The present system of using CONEX containers and refrigerated vans for port clearance is less than economical and increases the possibility of spoilage of cargo due to the time elapsed between discharge from the reefer vessel and storage in the warehouse.

RECOMMENDATION: That a concerted effort be made to build a rail spur to the Long Binh Depot to allow the movement of reefer cargo and dry cargo from the port directly to the Depot.



ANNEX B, (Cont'd)

4. Expansion of Rail Passenger Service.

OBSERVATION: Rail passenger service should be expanded to provide for movement of local national employees of the U.S. Military from the Saigon area to Long Binh.

EVALUATION: The rail line within III Corps Tactical Zone is open and in use between Saigon Main Station and the Ho Nai Station. On 19 May 1969, expanded passenger service was initiated between Go Vap Station and Ho Nai Station for a portion of the Local National employees of the US Military. The service has been very satisfactory with an average utilization of 400 passengers daily. The gratifying response to this service has been the encouragement to expand the service to include all Local National employees on Long Binh Post. There are plans to further expand this service to the extent of adding a second train to accommodate the remaining Local National personnel who are employed on Long Binh Post. As the situation stands now, there is still a need for buses to shuttle passengers from Ho Nai Station to Long Binh Post. The service would be much more effective and attractive if a spur from Ho Nai to Long Binh would be built. This would greatly reduce the necessity for the number of administrative vehicles now in use.

RECOMMENDATION: Recommend that expansion of the rail passenger service be given continued emphasis, particularly the aspect of building a spur from the Ho Nai Station to Long Binh Depot.

ANNEX B, (Cont'd)

5. Expanded Utilization of Common Service Highway Assets...

OBSERVATION: Prior to May 69 the bulk of all cargo shipped from Can Tho was moving by air and water. Beginning 1 May, TMA began receiving larger movement commitments from the 120th Transportation Company (Med Trk) and reassessed challenge usage.

EVALUATION: TMA has always realized that highway is the cheapest of the three modes available to the Delta. Prior to May 1969, however, the availability of highway transport was minimal. American convoys were restricted to short hauls usually not exceeding 35 kilometers from Can Tho. As a result of lack of transport, highway compatible cargo was often shipped by air or water at an increased cost.

RECOMMENDATION: After 1 May the 48th Transportation Group committed its 120th Transportation Company to line haul operations in the Delta presenting TMA with a large highway movement capability, but there was only a small amount of highway cargo move. Although shippers were at first reluctant to ship by highway, TMA, through its challenge authority, was able to divert large amounts of bulk cargo to highway offerings. This has resulted in savings across the board; first in savings from challenges and now in savings due to the fact that shippers, now accustomed to shipping by highway, most often offer their cargo with RDDs compatible to the highway mode. Recommendation consideration be given to expanded highway use throughout the transportation system.

## ANNEX C, SEALIFT

### 1. Movement of Lime and Cement by Water Transportation Assets.

OBSERVATION: Lime and cement are poorly packaged and palletized. Frequent handling or transshipping and exposure to the weather is causing significant damage and loss.

EVALUATION: There are shipments of lime and cement intra-RVN while at the same time shipments are being received from out of country. Lime and cement are palletized, but very poorly, and the weakness of the pallets provides little protection during handling. The lack of water-proofing or protective material of substance and quality permits significant damage when shipped by barge.

### RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. Insist on better packaging and palletizing for shipment.
2. Commodity managers for lime and cement must decide where they want the items initially and avoid double handling and transshipment.
3. Ship lime and cement wherever possible via LST or deep draft shipping to avoid exposure to rain and sea.

C - 15

ANNEX D, GENERAL

1. Use of Standing Transportation Movement Release Numbers (STR)

OBSERVATION: Prior to 1 June 1969, all field rations to fifteen outlying areas in the Mekong Delta were shipped bi-weekly under routine air releases issued by TMA. This was resulting in the use of 30 separate release numbers being issued weekly for the same type of cargo offered by the same shipper for movement to the same destination.

EVALUATION: The 575th Supply and Service Company operates the class I break-bulk point in Can Tho and is responsible for the breakdown and shipment of all rations to Delta advisory teams and other unit operating without class I supply points in the Mekong River Delta. Problems arising from large shipments of bulk rations were faced by TMA from the time of their arrival in the Delta. These problems concerned releasing and scheduling rations for air shipment. Through implementation of a bi-weekly rations movements schedule, TMA was able to relieve the burden on the aerial port team and, at the same time, enable themselves to successfully monitor the rations movement. However, TMA was also faced with repetition in the form of issuing some 30 TR numbers per week, in spite of the fact that all the moves were essentially the same.

RECOMMENDATION: Upon conclusion of a one-month survey of ration movements TMA representatives met with officer and NCO in charge of the class I supply point and determined that the movement of rations within the Delta was, indeed, repetitive and varied week to week only in weights shipped and possible deletions of certain destinations. With the aid of the Class I officer, TMA was able to determine the maximum number of destinations served by Can Tho Class I supply. With this knowledge, TMA was able to issue a standing transportation movement release number which has reduced the handling and processing time for ration shipments by approximately 60 per cent, without the loss of any coordination or control functions. Recommend that all recurring shipments of like cargo from the same shippers be reviewed and possible assignment of STR be considered throughout the transportation system.

AVHGC-DST (15 Aug 69) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 507th Transportation Group (Movement Control)  
for Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS USFOR-65 (R1) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 6 00 000

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPCP-DT,  
APO 96350

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army,  
Washington, D. C. 20310

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 July 1969 from Headquarters, 507th Transportation Group (Movement Control).

2. Comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning "Consolidating Special Airlift Missions and Converting to Scheduled Missions", ANNEX A1; concur. In future airlift operations, full consideration will be given, wherever possible, to the consolidation of special airlift missions and the conversion to scheduled missions within USARV.

b. Reference item concerning "Revised Air Schedules", ANNEX A2; concur. The recommendation to provide adequate reefer facilities at aerial ports to preclude spoilage in the event of a cancellation by aircraft has merit; however, adequate facilities must first be constructed at the ports and depots to handle the through-put. The construction of reefer facilities at aerial ports as proposed by the 1st Logistical Command should be given second priority.

c. Reference item concerning "The Dow Insulated Container", ANNEX A3; nonconcur. The 1st Logistical Command has reviewed the transportation distribution system presently employed and has found it to be adequate. The expenditure of funds for the recommended construction would far exceed the value of commodities which spoil during transit and would require double handling of all cargo. The Dow Insulated Containers have justified their initial procurement cost by providing a means of delivery for a fresh product. Further procurement of containers is planned by the 1st Logistical Command with specifications developed jointly by the Director of Food and the ACofS, Transportation.

d. Reference item concerning "Cargo Pilferage", ANNEX B2; Concur with the recommendation that rail cargo security be made a matter of command interest at the highest levels. Nonconcur with second portion of the recommendation that US train guards must accompany each train and report each incident of attempted bribery and pilferage. Train security is an MP function.

AVHGC-DST (15 Aug 69) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 507th Transportation Group (Movement Control)  
for Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (K1) (U)

Current personnel assets do not permit the MP's to ride as train guards. Flat cars are easily pilfered and high value cargo should be placed in box cars with the doors welded shut, or in CONEX containers placed face to face on flat cars when proper security is not available. As US rail cargo shipments increase, so too will pilferage and security problems. USARV will closely monitor this problem and continued emphasis will be placed on the security of rail cargo.

e. Reference item concerning "Expansion of Rail Freight Service to the Long Binh Depot", ANNEX B3; concur. The rail spur to the Long Binh Depot is second in order of priority among construction projects on Long Binh Post. Construction of the rail spur is presently underway and the earthwork is 39 per cent completed. Work has been hampered by rain and the necessity to relocate a portion of the Long Binh Post perimeter. The first segment of the rail spur includes service to the Class I warehouses.

f. Reference item concerning "Expansion of Rail Passenger Service", ANNEX B4; concur. Emphasis is being placed on the construction of a Long Binh Spur. Current planning involves a local project to improve the facility and appearance of Ho Nai Station. Consideration will also be given to the use of the Long Binh Spur for passengers thereby reducing local bus requirements.

g. Reference item concerning "Expanded Utilization of Common Service Highway Assets", ANNEX B5; concur. Due to the scarcity of trucks, the Traffic Management Agency (TMA) will have to continue to exercise its challenge authority in order to demonstrate the advantages of the highway mode of transportation. This headquarters will continue to monitor the expanded use of common service highway assets.

h. Reference item concerning "Movement of Lime and Cement by Water Transportation Assets", ANNEX C1; concur. USARV has contacted TMA-MACV and established a procedure whereby shipments are identified for direct routing between only two points, via LST or deep draft vessels, without needless transshipment. TMA-MACV is the agency which determines routing and the type vessel nominated. USARV has issued specific instructions to shippers regarding cargo inspection prior to release to insure adequate packaging and palletizing. Cement is palletized on standard warehouse pallets and covered with sheet plastic which, under normal handling, has proven adequate.

i. Reference item concerning "Use of Standing Transportation Movement Release Number", ANNEX D1; concur. TMA-MACV is the agency responsible for the issuance of Transportation Movement Release Numbers (TMR) and has the



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SUBJECT: Operational Report of 507th Transportation Group (Movement Control)  
for Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS CSFCK-65 (R1) (U)

authority to issue a Standing Transportation Movement Release Number (STMR)  
for repetitive shipments. TMA-MACV is reviewing all recurring shipments and  
when practicable is assigning an STMR.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



B. A. GOODWIN

MAJ, AGC

Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:  
507th Trans Gp

GPOP-DT (15 Aug 69) 2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 507th Transportation  
Group (Movement Control) for Period Ending  
31 July 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 29 OCT 69

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff For Force Development, Department  
of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:



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